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productivity and falls  with
in the Presence of Social  labor mobility. Because  labor
Capital  rmobility generates  a negative
externality, integration of
labor markets  results  in too
Maurice Schiff  much  mobility,  too low a level
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ambiguous effect on welfare.
Trade liberalization  is  superior
to labor market integration
because  it reduces  mobility
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Summary  findings
Labor  market  integration  is typically  assumed  to  improve  Whether  positive  or  negative,  the welfare  impact  is
welfare  in the absence  of distortions,  because  it allows  larger  the more  similar  the  levels of  social capital  of the
labor  to  move to where  returns  are  highest.  integrating  regions  are and  the lower  the  migration  costs
Schiff examines  this result  in a simple  general  are.
equilibrium  model  in the  presence  of a common  property  e  Trade  liberalization  generates  an additional
resource:  social capital.  benefit-over  and above  the standard  gains from  trade
Drawing  on evidence  that  social  capital  raises  - by reducing  labor  mobility  and  the negative
productivity  and  falls with  labor  mobility,  Schiff's main  externality  associated  with  it. Trade  liberalization  is
findings  are that:  superior  to labor  market  integration.
*  Labor  market  integration  imposes  a nega-ive  * The  creation  of new private  or public  institutions  in
externality  and need  not  raise welfare.  response  to  labor  market  integration  may  reduce  welfare.
*  The welfare  impact  is more  beneficial  (or less  Schiff shows  that  the  welfare  implications  depend  on
harmful)  the greater  the  difference  in endowments  is  two  parameters  of the model,  the  curvature  of the  utility
between  the integrating  regions.  function  and  the cost  of private  migration.
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for useful comments.Labor Market Integration in the Presence of Social Capital
1. Introduction
This paper examines the welfare impact of labor market integration in the
presence of social capital. A number of studies have shown that social capital affects
social and economic well-being. For instance, in a paper on participation in civic
organizations, Putnam (1995) describes studies showing that more civically active
communities in the U.S.-those  with high levels of social capital-are  more successful in
reducing poverty, unemployment, crime and drug abuse, and more successful in areas of
education and health. Similarly, Narayan and Pritchett (1997) find that higher levels of
associational membership are related to higher incomes in a sample of Tanzanian
villages. And in his celebrated study of civic traditions in Italy, Putnam (1993) shows that
the quality of local or regional public services is positively related to the degree of
participation in "horizontal associations" or networks.
One implication of these studies is that a decline in social capital is likely to have
serious economic and social consequences, including on violent crime (Lederman et al.
1999).l In fact, there is persuasive evidence in the U.S. of a significant decline in social
capital, in terms of vibrancy of civil society, in recent decades (Putnam 1995).
Participation in state and local elections declined by close to 25% from the early 1960s to
1990. And attendance at public school and town meetings, at political rallies, and serving
on committees of local organizations, all fell by some 40% between 1973 and 1993.
Similar or larger reductions occurred in the number of volunteers for civic organizations,
Their study  covers  39 developed  and developing  countries  and shows  that  trust reduces  the incidence
of violent  crimes.
1including the League of Women Voters, the Elks Club, and the Red Cross (off by 61%
since 1970). And this decline took place despite the sharp rise in education levels-the
best predictor of participation in civic organizations.
Participation in formal civic groups and organizations is one aspect of social
capital. Others include social trust and norms of cooperative behavior. Evidence shows
that these aspects of social capital have also declined in the U.S.  For instance, the
proportion of people saying most Americans can be trusted has shown a steady decline,
falling by over a third, from 55-60%/o  in the late 1950s and early 1960s to 35-39% in the
1990s  (Knack and Keefer 1997).2
Moreover, Coleman (1988) argues that trust and cooperative behavior is low in
the U.S. relative to other countries. For instance, he writes that in Jerusalem, children
unattended by their parents are "looked after" by adults in the vicinity, and that this does
not happen in most metropolitan areas of the United States. He concludes that families in
Jerusalem have available to them social capital that does not exist in most metropolitan
areas of the United States.
Similarly, given the high level of trust in their country, Danish citizens often leave
their small children in strollers on the sidewalk while shopping or eating. This practice
led to the arrest of a Danish mother visiting New York (N.Y. Times, May 22, 1997). She
had not realized that she was no longer in a high-trust environment.  New Yorkers, on
2  Knack  and Keefer  also  find a positive  relation  between  trust and civic normns  on the one hand, and
growth  performance  on the other, though  not between  membership  in formal  groups  and growth.
2the other hand, were shocked by her behavior: acting cooperatively in a non-cooperative
environment can indeed be dangerous! 3
Why the decline or low level of social capital in the U.S.? A hypothesis that is
often suggested is labor mobility. Due to the enormous degree of mobility over a very
extended geographical area, people in the U.S. tend to live further away from their family
(parents, siblings, cousins, and others), childhood friends, and original community, and
they tend to rely less on these support groups. For instance, data for the late 1980s and
early 1990s indicate that some 20% of U.S. households move annually, something
unheard of in other countries.
As for the decline over time, Putnam (1995) lists increased labor mobility as one
of the major causes of the erosion of social capital in the U.S. He argues that residential
stability is associated with greater civic engagement, while mobility uproots people and
reduces civic participation. As Fannie Mae4 advertises: "Neighborhoods are stronger
when families are able to own their own homes." And Hagan et al. (1996) find in a
longitudinal study of adolescents in Toronto that multiple family moves have a
deleterious effect on children's  emotional adjustment and educational achievement. They
3  Transactions  take place within  a social  structure  which  determines  the rewards  and penalties  for honesty
and cheating  (Becker  1974).  A higher degree  of mobility  tends  to weaken  social  ties, and transactions
among  less  familiar  agents  are likely  to result in more  cheating,  less  trust, and higher  transactions  costs.
Some  of these  issues are reviewed  in detail  in Zak and  Knack  (1998).  An interesting  example  is the
rotating  credit association  (ROCA),  where  members-who are typically  unable  to borrow  from the
formal  banking  system-put their contributions  together  and one of them (typically  chosen  at random)
obtains  the full sum.  Over time, as this is repeated,  all members  get to borrow.  ROCAs  only  work  if the
early  recipients  do not defect,  and requires  a high degree  of closeness  and trust and strong  social
sanctions,  including  ostracism  (Laguerre,  1998).  ROCAs  are consistently  identified  as a key resource
for the creation  of small  businesses,  as for instance  in Asian  immigrant  firms in the U.S. (Light  1984).
Given  the success  of ROCAs  among  inumigrant  groups  in the U.S., attempts  have  been made  to make
them work  among  U.S. citizens.  However,  most attempts  have failed  -with  defection  of early
recipients-because of weaker  relations  among  participants  and weaker  social  sanctions.
4  Fannie  Mae  provides  liquidity  by creating  a secondary  market  for mortgages.  It buys mortgage  loans
from banks, packages them into securities and sells them, enabling banks to make more loans.
3link this to the fact that leaving a community destroys established bonds, and deprives
family and children of a major source of social capital.
This paper models the link lbetween labor market integration, social capital and
welfare. Following the empirical findings in the literature, labor mobility and social
capital are assumed to exhibit a negative relationship. A central point of the paper is that
a unit of labor's productivity andlor utility depend in part on the social capital
characteristics of the group to which it belongs.  Thus, movements of labor differ from
movements of goods because people create attachments with those with whom they share
values, language, culture, and more-i.e.,  with -whom  they share social capital.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. The
solution in the absence of labor market integration is provided in Section 3. Section 4
presents the labor market integration solution. Section 5 provides the solution in the
absence of the negative externalities associated with labor mobility, as well as the welfare
loss due to these externalities. Comparisons with the free trade equilibrium are examined
in Section 6. Section 7 looks at the impact of an increase in the area of the integrating
labor market. Section 8 examines a situation where labor market integration results in the
formation of alternative institutions. Section 9 concludes. An appendix provides
derivations of results.
2. The Model
The objective in this paper is to examine the impact of an increase in generalized
labor mobility across regions with similar incomes, and not unidirectional mobility from
poorer to richer areas in South-Nonth  or rural-urban migration. In this model, labor moves
4not because of regional income differences but because the supply of human skills is
unevenly distributed over space. This seems reasonable for a country like the U.S. where
many industries are concentrated spatially, 5 and labor movements are typically associated
with local or regional demand shocks for specific skills.
Assume two "islands" i = 1, 2, which are identical except for the endowment of
skills. Two-way migration is obtained by assuming different endowments of industry-
specific skills in each island, low moving costs for labor and prohibitive moving costs for
goods, say due to trade barriers. The assumption on relative moving costs of labor and
goods is reversed in Section 5.
Assume that the initial population on both islands is n = 1. Denote by nij  the
proportion of natives of Island i living on Island j (i, j = 1, 2). Before migration takes
place, n 11 =  n 22 =  1, and the proportion that migrates m = n12 = n21 =0 -
Each native of Island 1 (2) produces the same quantity of a single good H (h).
Each individual from Island i living on Island j, Iij, consumes Hij and h 1j units of H and h,
with utility given by
UM = HijA +hy4  <  1  (1)
Output of H and h depends on a specific factor as well as on local public goods
and services whose provision, based on the evidence provided in Putnam (1993, 1995), is
positively related to the level of social capital. Alternatively, assume that output depends
on the specific factor and on aspects of social capital such as the extent of trust and
cooperation among individuals which, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Narayan and
5  Spatially  concentrated  industries  include  the computer  industry  in Silicon  Valley  and the Washington,
D.C. area, aerospace  in Southern  California  and  Washington  State,  automobiles  in the Midwest,
movies  in Hollywood,  finance  in New  York city, and  textiles  in the South.
5Pritchett (1997) have shown, lower transactions costs and improve economic
perfornance.  Thus, H (h) is produced with human capital or skills K (k) and social
capital. Only natives of Island 1 (2) are endowed with skills of type K (k).  The
production functions for H and h are Hlj = H(K, Slj) and h2j = h(k, S2j).  Specifically, Hij =
K. Slj and h2j = k.S2j. Without  loss of generality,  assume K = k = 1. Then
H 1j = S,l h21 = S2j;j  = 1,2. 6 (2)
Assume that the social capital Sii  of individual Iii  increases with the proportion n
of natives in the total population of island i, or equivalently, that it declines with the
proportion m = 1 -nii of migrants in the total population. In other words, and as the
evidence has shown, the lower the degree of mobility (m) of the population, the higher
the level of social capital because the proportion of those who have interacted for a long
period of time and have established,  cooperative relations and trust is higher. This is
supported by Durkin (1998) who argues that positive spillovers from a group-specific
public good rise with the share of that group in the population. Specifically, assume that
the level of social capital available to each native Iii  is equal to the number of potential
interactions with other natives, i.e., Sii  = nii.
An individual Iij  moving from Island i to Island j does not benefit from the same
amount of social capital as on his/her original island because creating a network of social
relations and building trust takes tine,  and some relations and experiences (e.g., those
with family and childhood friends) cannot be recreated. For instance, natives in Island i
6  We have  assumed  here that  social  capital  enters  the production  function  and not the utility function.
Assuming the latter-as  in Schiff (1992, 1998a, 1998b) and Schiff and Winters (1998)-implies  that
labor  market  integration  generates  two  negative  externalities  (in production  and utility  rather  than only
in the former).  This  reinforces  our results  but has no qualitative  effect  on them.
6may speak a different language than those in Island j. Hence, migrants gain partial access
to the social capital available in their island of destination. Specifically, the social capital
Sij available to a migrant from Island i to Island j (i ￿j)  is a proportion ax  < 1 of the social
capital of natives of Island j, i.e., S  j = a.njj.  For instance, if the language spoken on island
i differs from that on island j, a measures the degree of similarity between the two
languages. We thus have:
Sij =a 1-  n,O<a'  l;i,j=1,2,  (3)
where 8jj  = 1 for i = j (no migration) and 8ij  = 0 for i ￿  j (migration).
Finally, assume that migration entails real resource costs (e.g., goods, time and/or
depreciation of skills), and that an emigrant leaving Island i with 1 unit of skills arrives in
Islandj with 'yunits, where O  <y  <1.  Thus, given symmetry, migrants' productive
efficiency falls to a proportion £ - ocy  < 1 of its original value.
3. No Labor Market Integration
In the absence of migration, i = j.  Since H and h are not traded , it follows from
equations (2) and (3) that HI  = SI1 = ni  =  1, h22 =  S2 2= n22 =1 and H22 =  hi1 = 0, and
from equation (1) that utility is U1 I = U22 =  1. The natives of Island 1 consume no h and
the natives of Island 2 consume no H. The relative value of H (in units of h) on island i,
Pi, equals the ratio of marginal utilities, which-from  equation (l)-is:  Pi - (hjj/Hjj)'-1.  In
the absence of migration, PI = 0 and P2 = oo. Consequently, there is an incentive to
migrate in both directions; that is, those with skills K have an incentive to move from
Island 1 to Island 2 and those with skills k from Island 2 to Island 1.
74. Labor Market Integration
Assume now that the two islands sign a treaty integrating their labor markets by
allowing free movement of people between them. As long as the migration benefits are
larger than their private costs-which  is the case since P1 = 0 and P2 = co--people  from
Island 1 (2) will take their skills K (k) to Island 2 (1) in order to produce H (h) there and
exchange part of it for h (H). Because people migrate in both directions, goods H and h
are now available on both islands.
Migration has three effects on welfare. First, since both H and h are now produced
and consumed on both islands, everyone benefits from diversification of consumption.
On the other hand, migration leads to a private loss of productive skills due to real
migration costs and private loss of social capital. And third, migration generates negative
externalities which lower social capital
Natives from Island i maximize Uij. This includes choosing the value ofj,  that is j
￿  i (migrating) or j = i (not migrating). Given symmetry, we choose to focus on Island 1.
There are nine equations and nine variables. The variables are: nlI, m, SlI, S21, PI, Hi,,
h,1, H21 and h 21. The nine equations;  are:
Population identity:  (i) nl, +m=  1
Budget constraint of natives Iii:  (ii) Pl[(1-m)  - H11] = h,
Budget constraint of migrants 121:  (iii) ac(l- m)y - h2l =  H2
Market clearing:  (iv)  n,,[(l-  m)-  H,,] = m-H21
(iv') m[a(l-  m)y-  h2 ] = n1 ,  jh,
8First Order  Conditions:  (v)  . 1/Hi,)
(vi) PI  =k/2)-
Migration  Equilibrium:  (vii) U1l = U, 2 or Hl6  +hfI =  H42 + h1.
Given  symmetry, k 2 =  H21 and H 12 =  h2,  so that
(vii) Hfil  + h  = Hfil + h1
Social  Capital:  (viii)  Sll  nll
(iX)  S21 =an,,
Equation  (iv') is not independent  of equations  (ii), (iii) and (iv) because  of Walras
Law.  The solution  is given  below and the derivation  is provided  in the Appendix.  Recall
that £  y  is the amount  of productive  skills  available  to a migrant,  with (1- 6) being  the
loss of productive  skills  due to migration  costs and private loss of social capital.  The
equilibrium  number  of natives  n 11 and of migrants  m is
Q,
nll  1 f  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(4)
1+  8fl
m=  fl  (5)
1+ efl
Note that since  £  <1 and 3  < 1, n 1 2 m: no more than half the population  of each
island migrates.  Since the case  of n 1I  m + c > m (c > 0) is identical  to (a mirror image
of ) n, I = m - c < m, except  for the fact  that in the latter case,  resources  are wasted in
excess  migration,  n, I < m is never optimal.  Note that when £ = 1, migration  does not
result in a private loss of productive  skills,  n 11 = m = Y2,  and the two islands are identical
following  migration.  The relative  price of H (in units of h) is
P=  ￿1.  (6)
9That P1 c  1 is due to the fact that the supply of H is larger than the supply of h,
both because n 1 2 m and because migrants experience a private loss of their productive
skills. This is not the case for s = 1 where n11 = m =  2, PI =  1 (equation 6), and H =  h.
Consumption and utility are
H,,=  21  = (-/(l+  j))  (7)




a-l + £  "'
Ull  =U21  =HIl  Ig  =  91  2,0)E  (9)
From equation (9), it is clear that under labor market integration utility depends
exclusively on parameters  ; and  3. Given symmetry and migration arbitrage, utility U is
the same for all groups, i.e., U 11 =  IJ21 =  U22 =  U12 U.  Recall that in the absence of
migration, U = 1. The values of 6 and fi  for which U = 1 (the 'U=1'  contour) are shown in
Figure 1. The contour 'U = 1' is in fact a horizontal line at 3 =_2.  Thus, there are no
gains (or losses) from migration when fi = 12,  no matter what the value of s.
It can be shown from equation (9) that U > 1 below the line 'U = 1' where 0 < 1/2
(see Figure 1). Thus, labor market integration is beneficial for low values of ,B  because
marginal utility diminishes rapidly and the benefits of diversification are large. For
instance, utility increases from 1 for B  =  /2 to 2 for f  = 0. On the other hand, U <  1 above
the line 'U = 1' where f > 12.  Thus, labor market integration generates a welfare loss
when f is large.
7  From equation (9), for ,B  = 1/2,  U = (1/  + 1)/(1 +  1/c)  = 1 and is independent of E.
10The fact that welfare increases for low values of 1  can be given an alternative
interpretation. If H and h were perfect substitutes, there would be no gain from
diversification and migration would only involve costs. On the other hand, the greater the
difference between H and h, the greater the gains from diversifying consumption. In other
words, for any level of H and h, the greater the difference in their marginal utilities, the
greater the benefits from diversification. The ratio of marginal utilities UH/Uh = (h/H)1-0.
For /3  = 1, UH/Uh  = 1, H and h are perfect substitutes (with U = H + h), and there are no
gains from diversification.  The higher the value of,3, the greater the degree of
substitution between H and h, and the smaller the benefits of diversification.  As the
value of / falls, the degree of substitution between H and h falls as well, and the benefits
of diversification increase.
Note that a low degree of substitution between H and h implies a low degree of
substitution between inputs K and k. Thus, if integration is between two "islands" or
countries with similar labor endowments (with skills K similar to k), the gains from
diversification are likely to be small. If the countries have different types of labor
endowments (e.g., farmers versus industrial workers) and produce different goods
(agriculture versus manufactures), labor market integration is more likely to generate
welfare gains.
What about the relationship aU/&s between private migration costs (I-c) and
welfare?  From Figure 1-and  from equation (10) in Section 8 and Figure 2 below-we
can see that AU/&e >O for /  `  I/2  (where U i< 1). In other words, for 3  <  /2 , U > 1, and
the benefits of migration rise as the private migration costs (1  -s) fall. This makes sense: if
migration is beneficial, lower private costs--which result in more migration--is more
11beneficial. For 0 > l2, U < 1, and aIJ/&  < 0. In other words, if migration lowers welfare,
then as private migration costs (1  -E) fall, migration increases, resulting in a greater
welfare loss. In this case, a decrease in private migration costs results in immiserization
due to the dominance of the negative externalities associated with increased migration.
Thus, whether positive or negative, the impact of migration on welfare increases
with s. In other words, whether beneficial or not, the impact of migration is larger the
lower the real migration costs and the closer the social capital of the two "islands".
In general, labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare in the
presence of the negative externality on social capital. If the externality were internalized,
a political change allowing free movement of people across the islands would result in
less migration and would unambiguously raise welfare. The equilibrium level of
migration is higher than the welfare-maximizing one. This is likely to be especially
important in a country such as the U.S. because it constitutes the largest and most
integrated labor market (see Section 7).
What can the authorities do to raise welfare? Though a tax on mobility might
help, it is unacceptable in a democraltic  society where freedom of movement is a
fundamental right. An alternative is to subsidize length of residence. For instance, as
mentioned in Section 1, homeowners,  are known to invest more than renters in their
neighborhood, in terms of internal and external care of their homes, interaction with
neighbors, beautification of public areas, and crime prevention. A subsidy on home
ownership would thus help build social capital. This is the case in the U.S. where interest
payments on the mortgage are tax dedluctible.  An additional measure that would help
12would be to make the capital gains tax on the sale of a house a declining function of the
length of time of residence.
5. Labor Market Integration in the Absence of Externalities
Comparing the equilibrium with and without externalities can help us further
understand the impact externalities have on migration, social capital, consumption and
welfare. It is also helpful in characterizing the equilibrium under free trade in Section 6.
An absence of externalities associated with migration can occur if people in both
"islands" are identical in terms of the attributes of social capital. For instance, in the case
of two regions within a given country for which the only relevant characteristic of social
capital is nationality, two-way migration will not affect social capital in either region.
And if the only characteristic that matters is the identity of the 'club'  one belongs to,
including a church, social club or sports club, two-way migration by people belonging to
the same club has no impact on social capital either. 8
In those cases, social capital is not affected by migration and remains equal to 1
rather than (1  -m). Moreover, there is no private loss of social capital from migration
either, i.e., a = 1. Replacing (1r-m)  by 1 and a by 1 in the system of equations (i)-(ix),
and solving it, we obtain the same solutions for n,  1, m and PI as when externalities are
N,  N  pN  -- hrte present, but with s_  ay replaced by y 2 s.  Thus, ni I,  m  and p1 N values--where the
superscript 'N'  stands for "no externality"--are also given by equations (4), (5) and (6),
8  One can think  of the characteristic  shared  by members  of a "club"  as a "club good."  Clubs  include
religious  groups.  These  regularly  internalize  the externality  associated  with entry  and exit from the
club  through  prohibitions  and sacrifice.  This is examined  by lannaccone  (1992) in a club-good  model
where  members  benefit  from the religious  and social  activity  of other  members.  Prohibitions  and
sacrifice  may  make all club  members  better off. Of  course,  if prohibitions  are coercive  and  exit is
13respectively, except for s replaced by y. Since y 2 £, nl  2 nil, mN 2 m and p1N 2
And HN, hN and UN are all larger in the absence of externalities. In the case of
externalities, H = n11
2 (equations 4 and 7). In this case, HN = ni N > ni1 > ni 2 = H.
Similarly, with externalities, h = nl 
2.61( 1 -P°  (equations 4 and 8) while hN  I 11N. YI/(
1 1-0  >
h. Thus, UN  > U.
For instance, assume y = I and a = f3  = V2.  For,B=1/2,  welfare U= 1 in the
presence of externalities. Note that n 1 = 2/3, H = 4/9 and h =  1/9. In the absence of
externalities, nlN  =  mN  =2,  HN =  hN = '2, and U = 1.41. Thus, the externalities result in
an 1  1% reduction (from 50 to 44.4%o)  in consumption of H, a 76% reduction (from 50 to
11.1  %) in the consumption of h, and a 29% reduction in welfare (from 1.41 to 1).
6. Equilibrium under free trade
Mundell (1957) has shown the equivalence between the movement of goods and
the movement of factors. On the other hand, a number of politicians and economists in
the US and the EU support free trade while also advocating restrictions on migration.
Bhagwati (1991, p.3) argues that this is due to a lack of consistent criteria by which the
two issues are judged, and (pp. 5-6) that applying the utilitarian logic leads to the free
migration solution. As we have seen in Section 4, this need not hold in the presence of
social capital.
Moving goods differs from nioving people because people create attachments
with those with whom they share values and culture. Insofar as trade and migration are
prevented, as in some sects, most members are likely to be worse off. For more on this, see Iannaccone
(1998). In this model, the extemality associated with mobility is not internalized.
14substitutes (which is the case in this model and in the Heckscher-Ohlin one)9, trade
liberalization generates an additional welfare gain by reducing or eliminating migration
and the negative externality associated with it. So far, we assumed that, due to prohibitive
trade barriers,  H and h are not traded. Assume now that the trade barriers are removed,
and that the physical costs of moving H and h are the same as those for moving people
(1-y). Then, the solution under free trade is UFT  = (n, 1N)O.(l  +y 1 (1~) where 'FT'  stands
for 'free trade'  and n, 1N is the share of natives staying in their own island in the absence
of externalities (see Section 5). This solution is the same as in Section 5, i.e., UFT=  UN.
Thus, UFT  > U.
For instance, assume that both trade costs and private migration costs are zero,
i.e., y  = 1. Then, under free trade, goods and factor prices are equalized across islands and
there is no incentive to migrate. Given symmetry, people on island 1 (2) produce one unit
of H (h) and export half of it for half a unit of h (H). Thus, everyone consumes half a unit
of H and h, and welfare is UFT  = 2/2  > 1. For a  = 12,  UFT=  1.41. Under labor market
integration, U = 1 when ,3= 1/2. Thus, welfare is 41% higher under free trade than under
free migration, as in Section 5. The reason for the higher welfare under free trade is that
migration reduces the social capital of migrants and generates a negative externality on
the social capital of those left behind, while trade does not.
Consequently, integration of markets for goods H and h is superior to labor
market integration (assuming that trading costs are no larger than private migration
9  Markusen (1983) obtains complementarity between trade and migration by amending different features
of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Lopez and Schiff (1998) obtain complementarity for unskilled labor and
substitution for skilled labor in a model with migration costs and financing constraints. In the present
model, either labor or goods move-depending  on which moving costs are lower-but  not both.
15costs). Thus, a policy directed at integrating goods markets is likely to generate a higher
level of welfare than a policy aiminig  to integrate labor markets.
7. Increasing the migration area.
Assume that instead of two "islands," there are fifty "states". People in each state
are endowed with a unique skill and produce a unique good. The fifty goods enter
symmetrically in everybody's utility function which is the same for all and is now U=
lr(Hijr)r, with r = 1,..., 50 represenling the 50 goods. Assume the 50 states now allow
free movement of people.  This results in a much larger proportion of people migrating
than in the two-island case because there are forty nine other states where the returns to
one's skills are higher and it takes vastly larger amounts of migration to arbitrage away
the private migration benefits. Though social capital falls more in the large country, since
the gains from diversification are larger, the welfare impact of increased mobility is
ambiguous.
For instance, as shown in Section 4, in the symmetric two-island case, if there are
no private migration costs (a = 7 = E:  =  1), then n, I = n 22 = m = 1/2; that is, 50% of the
people remain on their own island and social capital is reduced by half.  However, if the
same conditions prevail in the case of 50 states, then nii  = 1/50 and m = 49/50; that is,
only 2% of people remain in their own state, 98% move and social capital is reduced by
98%.
Our model thus shows why the social support structure deteriorates to a larger
degree in a large country than in a srnall one and hence why people tend to be more
isolated in the forner.  And given the negative externalities, people will be too isolated
16from the viewpoint of Pareto optimality.  The problem exists in small countries as well
but is more pronounced in larger countries such as the United States, Brazil or Russia.
The problem would be expected to be most severe in the United States as it constitutes
the largest and most fully integrated labor market.
8. Institutional Change
With the increased labor mobility associated with labor market integration, new
institutions are likely to emerge in response to a greater demand for lower migration costs
(higher 7y)  and lower private social capital losses (higher c). For instance, if different
languages are spoken in the two islands, the higher degree of inter-island labor mobility
may lead authorities to include the other island's language in the school curriculum
(raising a). It may also lead the authorities of both islands to cooperate on deep
integration measures. These may include migration facilitation measures (raising y)  such
as eliminating requirements for visas (as is the case for many countries) and for work
permits (as in the EU), and improvement in transport networks.
Other developments that are likely to facilitate labor mobility include the creation
of hotel and restaurant chains which provide standardized services of predictable quality
and enable travelers to feel in more familiar surroundings when away from home. These
types of institutions help reduce the private loss of social capital (raise ax)  associated with
increased labor mobility, though they are also likely to reduce mobility costs (raise -y).
Others institutions designed to lower mobility costs include private and public agencies
providing infornation  on distant labor markets,10 moving companies, credit card
10  Rosenbloom (1988) examined the role of employment agencies and publicly sponsored labor
exchanges in the integration of the U.S. labor market in the late 19h century. He found that though they
17companies, the interstate highway system, and legislation to increase the inter-firm
portability of pensions.
Private institutions will not arise unless they are profitable, i.e., unless the private
value of the services is higher than the cost. But will they raise welfare?  In analyzing
institutional development, the main theoretical framework used in the early days of the
cliometric school (1970s) was neoclassical economics. Under this approach, institutions
developed optimally in response to market demand. Theoretical and empirical
developments, including strategic interactions, asymmetric information, interdependence
of agents' tastes, insecure property rights, and coordination problems, affected the
development of cliometrics and led to the understanding that institutional development
might not be optimal (Greif, 1997). In this paper, institutional development need not be
optimal because of the negative externality on social capital associated with increased
mobility.
If the externality is small, so that the private migration equilibrium is not much
larger than the social optimum, then a new institution lowering migration costs and
resulting in an increase in migration is likely to raise welfare. However, where migration
externalities are large and the socially optimal migration level is significantly lower than
the market equilibrium, then it is more likely that a new institution resulting in an
increase in migration will lower welfare, even though it may be privately profitable.
increased  considerably  in local markets,  they  played a small  role in directing  long-distance  movements
of labor;  and real  wage differentials  between  large cities  persisted.  They  were higher in the Midwest
than on the East Coast  by some  20-25%/o,  with  no tendency  toward  convergence  (though  real  wage rates
in San  Francisco  converged  toward  eastern  levels  following  completion  of the transcontinental
railroad).  A truly  national  labor  market  only  emerged  in the 20e century  when  this gap fell  by some
70-80%.
18The welfare impact of a costless institutional change that raises s is obtained by
deriving U 1 in equation (9) with respect to £:
____t  2,8/  2ft-i+  2/3-  1  2,8
2
-2fl+
3U  #  0  2,B  24p-4tl  +  *g  i  . e(10)
2,B  2,  )6  14  p  8 
- ,51  £41  2fl2+  2q-1  t1  q  l'
The (£, 3)-contour  for which RRA5a  =0 is shown in Figure 2. The "aU,11&/ = 0"
contour is a straight line at 3 = I/2  (where U =  1). It can be shown from equation (10) that
32U/lacaf  < 0. Thus, aU/8a > 0 for : < 12,  and AU/RR  < 0 for i  > I/2,  i.e., lower migration
costs raise welfare if the benefits of diversification are large (/  < '2) and migration is
beneficial.
In the case of institutional changes which costlessly reduce migration costs, such
as elimination of visa and work permit requirements, these lower welfare for # > 12,  raise
welfare for ,B  < '2 and have no impact on welfare for / = 12.  In fact, some of these refonns
may entail administrative simplification and save resources. Any such gains must enter in
the cost-benefit calculus of the reform. For instance, in the presence of such gains, a
reform would raise welfare for / =  /2.
What if institutional change is costly? Assume the cost of some change-say,  an
improvement in the inter-island transport system--is financed by general taxes unrelated
to the use of the new transport system. Then private migration costs fall. Abstracting
from transport improvement costs, welfare falls for ,  > 1/2 and rises for ,B  < 1/2.  Taking
transport improvement costs into account, welfare falls for /  > 1/2,  and the effect is
ambiguous for /3  < 12.  What if, instead of general taxes, a toll is levied such that
19migration costs are unchanged. Then, migration is unchanged. Whether welfare rises or
falls depends on whether toll revenues are larger or smaller, respectively, than the
transport improvement costs.
9.  Concluding Comments
In this paper, I have provided a simple model to explain the evidence on the
inverse relation between labor market integration, on the one hand, and the level of social
capital and social support structure, on the other.  Given that the movement of labor
generates a negative externality, labor market integration results in excessive labor
movement, excessively low levels of social capital, too much isolation, and an ambiguous
impact on welfare. This is particularly important for large and highly integrated labor
markets such as that of the United States, and has implications for the integration of other
labor markets, including the EU.
A positive welfare impact is more likely, the greater the gains from
diversification. That is, gains are more likely, the greater the difference in labor
endowments between the integrating countries or regions (e.g., skilled versus unskilled
labor, or agricultural versus industrial workers). Whether labor market integration
generates gains or losses, these are larger the closer the social capital of the people in the
integrating regions and the lower the real migration costs. Insofar as trade liberalization
reduces labor movements, it provides an additional benefit by reducing the negative
externality associated with labor mobility. Finally, new institutions designed to lower
mobility costs need not raise welfare.
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23Appendix
This appendix shows how equations (4) to (9) in the text are obtained.
(v),(vi)  =>  H,Ih,I  = H21/h21 (x)
(vii),(x)  > Hl  = H21;h 1l = hk  or
HJI  = H21 = k 2;hlI =  h 21= H 12 (xi)
(ii), (iv) ='  n, Ih I = m  H21 P  (xii)
(v),(vi), (xii) n 11/m = HI 2 l/hfl  Hl,6  (xiii)
(xi), (xiii)  n  =  (\IiJ,  (xiv) m  A
(1),(xiv) => nll=  - /Hllh)  =  H,  (xv)
I+ (n  1 )"  - h 1, +  I,
(1),(xv)=:>  m  kp  (xvi)
(ii), (iii), (xi)  =>  PI  (I - m) = i IHI  I + h I  PI(6
and  a(l-  m)r= iHl+  h 1l|
(v), (6) *  (h I /H,  1)  = £  (xvii)
(xvii)=>  (H1j/hk.)== .5`  (xviii)
.8
,
(xv), (xviii)  =n n1,=  f-  (4)
nl>  m, butif  a=  y =1  n,=  m=  2 and  P =1
(4),  (i)  m  (5)
1  + sgfi
(iv),(xi),(4) => H1 =ni  (7)
2#-I
(xvii),(7)  n  h,A  =I  =  nfl  81  (8)
p  2,6  2f-
(1),(7),(8)  Ul  +{(;)2}
nil  n(1+  e"-4)  (9)
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